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ABSTRACT
In 2020, over 8,400 people made their way from France to the UK coast using
small vessels. They did so principally in order to claim asylum in the United
Kingdom (UK). Much like in other border-zones, the UK state has portrayed
irregular Channel crossings as an invading threat and has deployed a
militarized response. While there is burgeoning scholarship focusing on
informal migrant camps in the Calais area, there has been little analysis of
state responses to irregular Channel crossings. This article begins to address
this gap, situating contemporary British responses to irregular Channel
crossers within the context of colonial histories and maritime legacies. We
focus particularly on the enduring appeal of “the offshore” as a place where
undesirable racialized populations can be placed. Our aim is to offer a
historicized perspective on this phenomenon which seeks to respond to calls
to embed colonial histories in analyses of the present.
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Introduction
Throughout 2020, over 8,400 people made their way from northern France to
the UK coast using small vessels such as rubber boats and dinghies (Timber-
lake 2021). Many made it to the British shoreline, landing on beaches in
Kent and East Sussex, while others were picked up by Border Force patrols
in the English Channel. Some who attempted this dangerous journey
drowned or were declared missing. Almost all of these crossings were made
in order to claim asylum in Britain, with no safe alternative route available.
In a Home Office Enquiry held in September that year, the UK Visas and
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Immigration agency (UKVI) confirmed that 98 per cent of those who arrived by
boat had since applied for asylum (Home Affairs Committee 2020b). These
journeys drew significant media attention, even in the midst of the Covid-
19 pandemic, which saw overall asylum applications in the UK fall by 41 per
cent from the previous year, reaching their lowest point in a decade (Walsh
2020). While the Strait of Dover has long been a significant site of asylum
seeker im/mobility, in recent years anti-migration politics in Britain and
France, and the adoption of the “Common European Asylum System”, have
led to thousands of would-be refugees becoming stranded on the French
side of this maritime border (Gray 2017; Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi 2017;
Cassidy, Yuval-Davis, and Wemyss 2018). Ever stronger border infrastructure,
diminishing hopes of gaining asylum in the EU, and the state-enforced
squalor that displaced people are exposed to in the port towns of Calais
and Dunkirk (see Dhesi, Isakjee, and Davies 2018; Hicks and Mallet 2019),
have led to an increasing number of desperate attempts to reach the UK by
any means possible.
In 2020, a combination of Brexit border stoppages, industrial action in the
port of Calais, and the turmoil created by the Covid-19 pandemic, caused
serious disruption to the usual passage of road haulage vehicles across the
border.1 This significantly reduced opportunities for people who were seeking
asylum to enter the UK by stowing away in lorries and freight trains – and it
increased the likelihood of even riskier methods of reaching Britain by boat,
with the number of perilous sea crossings up four-fold since 2019.2 Like in
other border zones around theworld, the violent conditions created by the poli-
tics of the border had deadly consequences (see Jones 2016; Mountz 2020). In
2020, seven people – including two infants – died while attempting these mar-
itime crossings. A 15-month-old babywas also reportedmissing after his family’s
overcrowded boat capsized in the Channel’s treacherous waters.
Faced with this maritime spectacle, and with refugee drownings off the
coast of England bringing total border deaths since 1999 close to 300 (Insti-
tute of Race Relations 2020), the UK government deployed military “assets”
including drones, coastal patrols and warships, comprising three cutters
named HMC “Vigilant”, “Searcher”, and “Seeker” (Home Office 2020a). Coordi-
nating this martial response, the UK Home Office also appointed an ex-marine
to the new position of “Clandestine Channel Threat Commander” or “Small
Boat Commander” with the explicit aim of “adopting interceptions at sea
and the direct return of boats” (Home Office 2020a). This naval militarization
was matched by the deployment of a distinctly militarized discourse and
social media campaign, in which people crossing the Channel in unseaworthy
boats were portrayed as an invading “threat” or criminal menace rather than
potentially vulnerable individuals fleeing direct and structural violence.
While there is burgeoning scholarship focusing on informal migrant camps
in the Pas-de-Calais (see Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi 2017, 2019; Mould 2017;
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Sandri 2018; Isakjee et al. 2020) there has been less attention paid to the
responses to irregular Channel crossings, and almost no scholarship on the
British state’s maritime response in particular. Indeed, the sea and the space
of the “offshore” has been absent in much discussion of this border. This
article begins to address this neglect, situating contemporary British
responses to irregular Channel crossers within the context of colonial histories.
In doing so, we focus on the enduring appeal of “the offshore” as a space
where “undesirable” racialized populations can be managed. As Shotwell
(2016, 139) has articulated, “our response to the past constitutes the con-
ditions of possibility for the present”, and our aim in this paper is to offer a his-
toricized perspective on the Channel crossings phenomenon which takes
seriously calls to embed colonial histories in analyses of the contemporary pol-
itical moment.
Other maritime border-zones such as the Mediterranean basin have been
the focus of intensive research in recent years (for an overview, see Squire and
Stierl 2020; Stierl 2020a). A small but growing part of this scholarship explores
the connections between EU responses to irregular boat arrivals within the
context of colonial histories and logics (for example, Saucier and Woods
2014; Danewid 2017; Proglio et al. 2021). This is also part of what has been
dubbed a “postcolonial turn” in critical migration studies (Koh 2015; Tudor
2018) and speaks to the same research agenda to which we wish to contrib-
ute. However, the particularities of the Channel border-zone and responses
by the British state also make this, like any border-zone, a unique case
which is worthy of further in-depth analysis.
We draw on a range of empirical materials, most notably the records of the
2020 UK Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into “Channel crossings,
migration and asylum-seeking routes through the EU”, as well as a range of
government statements, newspaper articles, UK Home Office social media
campaigns, and political speeches. But our focus is primarily conceptual
and our overarching aim is to show how the British response to irregular
Channel crossings can be understood within the context of colonial histories.
Our argument may then find resonance in other postcolonial contexts, par-
ticularly those where the space of the “offshore” is wielded as a technology
of control. The first section offers further context to the phenomenon of irre-
gular Channel crossings. The next section discusses the relationship between
contemporary border regimes and the legacies of colonialism in order to illus-
trate how the governance of contemporary mobility is shaped by ongoing
racialized hierarchies of human value. We then move into our analytical dis-
cussion of the “offshore” as a colonial practice and imaginary which builds on
the history of maritime empire and the racialized control of “undesirable” and
“devalued” populations.
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Contextualizing irregular channel crossings
The journeys of asylum seekers across the English Channel are anything but
new. During the Great War, for example, 250,000 Belgian refugees crossed the
Channel “crowding every floating thing that could possibly be put out to sea”
(Bailkin 2018, 16). Folkstone on the south coast of England became known as
a “town of refugees” with 35,000 arriving in October 1914 alone. Over a
century earlier, anarchist writer Peter Krotopkin described the Union Jack
as “the flag under which so many refugees, Russian, Italian, French, Hungarian
and of all nations, had found asylum” (cited in Holmes 1983). Long before this,
the English Channel had witnessed similar journeys by refugees in the bloody
wake of the sixteenth-century Reformation. Refugees moved across the water
in both directions – oppressed Catholics fled England for the continent, while
thousands of Walloon, Dutch, and Huguenot-French exiles made the 21-mile
crossing from France to England to escape persecution. As the English clergy-
man John Strype wrote, in Elizabethan England: “Great Numbers of them
therefore from all Parts daily fled over hither into the Queen’s dominions
for the safety of their lives” (Strype 1725, 554 sic). The Dover Strait, when
viewed through the longue durée of history, is no stranger to displacement
and asylum.
Nevertheless, any history of migration across the Channel, should not over-
look the wider role that British colonialism has played in constructing who
counts as a “real” refugee. It is in this context that the period since the late
1990s especially has seen a shift from people seeking asylum being construed
as primarily a humanitarian phenomenon, to being understood as primarily
an existential, economic, or racial threat (Mayblin 2019). This shift has
coincided with a change in the nationalities of those seeking asylum. No
longer are they European and racialized as white, now they come from for-
merly colonized countries, and are racialized as black and brown. In 2020
for example, the origin countries of people detected crossing the Channel
in small boats included Iran (51 per cent), Iraq (26 per cent), Syria (6 per
cent), Afghanistan (4 per cent), Yemen (2 per cent), Pakistan (1 per cent),
and Eritrea (1 per cent) (Walsh 2020). It is in this racialized context that the
Channel borderzone has become a site of securitization and militarization
against the perceived menace of irregular migrants seeking entry to the
UK. Within this shifting racialized milieu, the “threat” named in the Home
Office role of “Clandestine Channel Threat Commander” finds its bodily form.
People who are seeking asylum find themselves in the migration bottle-
neck of the Pas-de-Calais for a variety of individual reasons. During
fieldwork in northern France between 2015 and 2019, authors Isakjee and
Davies met displaced people who were in Calais for various reasons. This
included a translator who had worked for the British army during the military
occupation of his country in the wake of the “War of Terror”; as well as a
4 T. DAVIES ET AL.
young man who explained – in a thick Black Country accent – how he wanted
to return to his family in the West Midlands after being automatically
deported from the UK to Kabul when his temporary refugee status had
expired at the age of 18. Though each person’s migration story is different,
our research with people residing in informal camps in northern France
found four main reasons for being in Calais – several of them directly
linked to colonial histories (Davies and Isakjee 2019; Isakjee et al. 2020).
First, many displaced people have applied for asylum in France but remain
destitute while they wait to be accommodated. Second, some have been bio-
metrically processed and added to the EU Asylum Fingerprint Database
(EURODAC) in their first country of entry to the EU, yet are denied protection
and experience “coerced onwards migration” (Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi
2017, 1273) to northern European states. Third, many have close family in
the UK (often as a direct consequence of long-standing imperial ties to the
British metropole) yet few legal routes are available through which to
reunite with their kin, even for unaccompanied minors. Fourth, many
people view Britain as a “fair country” which respects human rights, and
offers safety and the possibility of a better future. This latter reason is often
connected with English being the lingua franca of colonial rule, again directly
implicating empire in the contemporary politics of asylum. None of these
groups can enter Britain legally in order to seek asylum, not least because
the UK routinely circumvents international refugee law. For example, it oper-
ates a policy of carrier sanctions whereby ferry and train operators, airlines,
and haulage companies would be fined if they allowed someone without
legal travel documents to enter the country using their services. This effec-
tively turns carriers into border guards and makes them highly circumspect
in relation to who is allowed to board a vessel.
As critical migration scholars have observed (Mayblin 2017; Davies and
Isakjee 2019; Mayblin and Turner 2020), the overwhelming majority of
people trapped at Britain’s borders, in places such as Calais, come from
former European colonies. A range of policies have been pursued by both
the French and British governments to punish and disperse them. As part
of these efforts, the port of Calais has been fortified against irregular
migrants. The “Great Wall of Calais”, for example, is a £2 million assemblage
of barbed wire fences and surveillance infrastructure that surrounds the Euro-
tunnel entrance and ferry port in the French border-town (Mould 2017).
These fortifications were constructed in late 2016 in response to the increased
visibility of migrants at the France-UK border (Isakjee et al. 2020). In general,
“when countries decide to build walls and patrol borders, it does not stop
people from moving but it does funnel them into more dangerous routes
and force them to rely on smugglers and human traffickers” (Brambilla and
Jones 2020, 297). In this way, the onshore fortifications and surveillance
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systems in Calais have directly contributed to increasing attempts to cross the
Channel using unseaworthy boats.
In response to these Channel crossings, the “defense” of British borders has
moved into the sea. This has included the kinds of militarized responses
detailed in the introduction: the use of drones, coastal patrols and warships;
and the appointment of a “Small Boats Commander”. It has also precipitated a
new period of policy discussion and development in Britain which has
coincided with the new vision for Britain’s post-Brexit “sovereign borders”
policy designed by the Home Office. In the final section of the paper, we
explore the range of strategies being discussed and deployed with a particu-
lar focus on the enduring colonial fantasy of “offshoring”. We suggest the pro-
posed asylum strategies created in the wake of increased Channel crossings
showcase “the contemporary force of imperial remains” (Stoler 2008, 196).
That is, not a formal continuation of empire or imperial rule, but a system
of racialized violence hinging on colonial ideas of human value and a nation-
alist ideology shielded and legitimated by the legacies of colonialism. Part of
that, of course, is an understanding that some lives are worth more than
others in a colonial and racial schema, and some mobilities should therefore
be filtered out at the border, whatever the cost. At the UK border, migrants
are placed at the sharp end of a filtration system that sees bodies marked
out as worthy or unworthy, based on inherited systems of prejudice, includ-
ing racialized notions of value (Rajaram 2018).
Before focusing on the UK government’s response to contemporary
Channel crossings, it is vital to place these state actions within a historical
context that recognizes the links between colonialism and border policy.
Beginning from the global scale and moving to the British case, in the next
section we particularly emphasize how maritime policies, offshoring, and
the sea have long been foundational to how Britain maintains and imagines
its borders. Having introduced our analytical starting point – colonial histories
of racial exclusion through border filtration – in the final section we draw on a
range of empirical data to explore how contemporary British responses to
irregular Channel crossings follow a distinctly colonial logic, particularly in
relation to the offshore as a policy solution and political imaginary.
Border controls and the legacies of colonialism
People originating in what we might term the “First World” or the “Global
North” are able to cross borders much more easily than people originating
in the “Third World” or the “Global South” (Achiume 2019); understanding
these terms as symbolic geographies (see Mayblin and Turner 2020). For
example, Mau et al. (2015) have analysed data on visa agreements and
found that since 1969 the opportunities for visa free travel have expanded
for citizens of OECD countries while they have stagnated or declined for
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citizens of African countries. In this way, it is relatively easy for someone with
a French, German, or Canadian passport to travel around the world legally.
Visa fees will be minimal, interrogations in airports rare. Meanwhile,
someone with a Jamaican or Ghanaian passport will be subject to a
barrage of checks, costs, barriers and en-route interrogations which make
moving across borders slow, difficult and expensive. Not only is the geogra-
phy of mobility globally uneven, it is also deeply connected to colonial
histories.
There is a growing literature which explains the colonial origins of border
controls, and the ways in which the racial logics of colonial era practices of
mobility control persist today (see Mayblin and Turner 2020 for an overview).
Browne (2015), for example, shows how bodily surveillance worked as a racia-
lized technology of mobility control from its inception as part of the organiz-
ation of the slave trade. Enslaved people were sorted and categorized at
transatlantic ports, inspected and documented through branding, wanted
posters, and slave logbooks in a manner that preceded and shaped the inven-
tion of paper documentation and the passport (see also Mongia 1999). Later,
and within the British Empire, colonial subjects did not enjoy real freedoms of
movement even within its constituent territories. Actual free movement only
existed for white Europeans and settlers; systems of centralized state border
controls were initially developed precisely to facilitate and control the move-
ment of indentured labourers (mostly from the Indian subcontinent) across
British and European empires – often via the sea – as a cheap and expendable
workforce to support imperial capitalist and settler state interests (Mongia
2018). People racialized as “inferior” were therefore often subjected to exten-
sive forms of control which accompanied exploitation and facilitated systems
of dispossession by accumulation (Turner 2020, 64–100). As Gurminder
K. Bhambra (2017) has argued, this means recognizing that the control of
mobility – and we can extend this to the purpose of border infrastructure –
emerged to regulate racialized mobility and to support white European
and capitalist interests. Put differently, the construction of race and the
border have always been linked.
As movements for decolonization were successful in many territories
across the British Empire in the post-war period (though also of course
across other empires as well), successive governments legislated to create
a British immigration regime for the metropole which aimed to strictly
curtail the movement of people who had previously been citizens of the
British Empire. Boat arrivals of people of colour carrying British passports
from other parts of the Commonwealth, such as the arrival of HMT “Empire
Windrush” to the UK from Jamaica in 1948, became symbolic of an “invasion”
that could threaten society (Fryer 1984). Commonwealth citizens, and then
“migrants”, from former colonies were therefore slowly stripped of their
right to move to the former metropole, particularly those racialized as non-
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white. Special effort was made, in fact, to ensure that white arrivals were not
curtailed (Paul 1997). In short, mobilities, particularly, though of course not
exclusively, in the context of postcolonial Britain, have always already been
shaped by racialized notions of value and belonging.
These same logics of racial value also applied to people seeking asylum,
which is pertinent to the case of irregular Channel crossers. When Britain
ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1954 it
did so (as did all other signatories) on the basis that refugees were defined
as Europeans displaced before 1951. This territorial restriction, which
remained until 1967, was hard won at the negotiations but it was necessary
because Britain and the other colonial powers did not view colonized subjects
to be fully entitled to – or even ready for – human rights. The right to asylum
was, therefore, racially discriminatory at its inception based on restrictive
definitions of humanity (Mayblin 2017). In the late 1990s, people applying
for asylum began to originate in formerly colonized Third World countries.
They were racialized as black and brown and came from low income “devel-
oping” states. Thus, Britain, and the other European and more broadly
“Western” states became explicitly hostile to refugees at the very moment
at which they started to arrive from these former colonial territories
(Mayblin 2017, 2019).
As intimated in the previous section, technologies of border filtration con-
tinue to operate through colonial demarcations of race, and this extends to
people who are seeking asylum. The rationale and knowledge of who to
surveil on the basis of who is considered valuable, dangerous or worthless,
is always already racialized (De Genova 2018; Rajaram 2018). Indeed, colonial
systems of racial distinction have fed into systems of value which may appear
detached from formal colonialism and yet shape who is viewed as “valuable”
or “surplus” in contemporary regimes of rights and under what Cedric Robin-
son identified as “racial capitalism” (1983). Border technologies are, therefore,
imprinted with culturally embedded ideas of who is seen as probably inno-
cent and valuable, and who is seen as potentially surplus or a “threat”. For
people who are seeking asylum their appearance and nationality mark
them out as dangerous and/or value-less, making it almost impossible to
travel through safe or legal routes (Mayblin 2017; Brambilla and Jones 2020).
One important aspect of these colonial era controls in the British Empire
was the role of maritime law as a means through which mobilities were
managed. For example, Browne (2015) argues that the architecture of the
Atlantic middle passage provided many of the technologies of control we
have come to associate with border regimes today (also see Sharpe 2016).
It was imperial port cities such as Mumbai and Aden where international
border controls were often first experimented with to regulate the passage
of indentured Asian labourers, through medical examinations, paper inspec-
tions and quarantines (Khaleli 2020; Turner 2020). When Indian “Lascar”
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sailors began to settle in London in the seventeenth century they were
subject to removal orders by the East India Company, who systematically
both devalued and exploited their labour against their white counterparts
(Weymss 2009). When imperial and settler authorities curtailed the move-
ment of Indian subjects to Canada in the early twentieth century, this was
done by limiting entry only to those travellers who had travelled continuously
by boat from their country of origin, effectively banning Indian immigration
through changing private shipping routes and ticketing policy (Gutiérrez
Rodríguez 2018, 22). On the British mainland, the first laws pertaining to
immigration in the twentieth century such as the Aliens Act of 1905, also tar-
geted seafarers who might be arriving at British ports; on the basis of per-
ceived penury, perceived ill-health, or perceived likelihood to be become a
public charge –meaning seafarers could be arbitrarily denied leave to disem-
bark (Fryer 1984).
If maritime conquest can be understood as a hallmark of British imperial-
ism, maritime crisis also punctuated its decline. The Suez crisis in particular
demonstrated how Britain’s maritime geopolitical dominance had dissipated
– and arguably transmuted into dependence on the US (Peden 2012). But as
importantly, the sea was also a key space for anti-colonial resistance, from on-
ship slave revolts (Stierl 2020b), to maroonage; and long voyages at sea, were
also important sites of connection for formal independence struggles (see
Legg 2020). Border measures were not, then, only developed to control
movement across the Empire but also to and from the metropole, and to
pacify relentless forms of struggle. This brief account demonstrates how
racialized ideas of who was “valuable” shaped who was subject to different
forms of filtration in the British Empire, just as these colonial bordering tech-
nologies worked through maritime infrastructure. In this way, the sea net-
worked people and wealth into the metropole, and conversely the offshore
space of empire was a particular site where racialized anxieties and practices
of control over who moved and settled were played out. The sea, then, has
played a vital role in Britain’s history of bordering. In the next section, by
examining contemporary responses to Channel crossings and the enduring
appeal of “the offshore” as a political imaginary, we argue that this is still
the case today.
Governing channel crossings and fantasies of the offshore
As a state spread across multiple islands, and a former Empire for whom mar-
itime travel, war, and trade was central, the sea is highly symbolic to British
nationalism. While Britain is no longer a formal Empire, the English Channel
has become a key site through which both the country’s maritime imaginary,
and its colonial nostalgia can be articulated. The English Channel is highly
symbolic in militarized nationalist narratives which focus on the “British”
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defense against Nazi Germany in the Second World War. More recently, the
debates around Brexit have seen both refugees and the EU being considered
threats to British sovereignty from “across the water”.
The colonial salience of “the offshore” has eased itself into everyday life
through frequent and uncritical evocations of empire as a period associated
with British achievement and success (Procter 2003; Valluvan 2019). For
example, when Prime Minister Boris Johnson set out his ambitions for a
“Global Britain” emerging as a consequence of Brexit, he chose a military cen-
terpiece of the British Empire as his backdrop. Giving his speech in February
2020 at the Royal Naval College at the heart of the Admiralty in Greenwich,
London, he emphasized to the gathered journalists that: “Above and
around us you can see the anchors, cables, rudders, sails, oars, ensigns,
powder barrels, sextants, the compasses and the grappling irons” (Johnson
2020a), before introducing his oceanic, neo-imperial plans through nautical
nostalgia and maritime metaphors. He concluded his speech by stating:
“There lies the port, the vessel puffs her sail. The wind sits in the mast. We
are embarked now on a great voyage!” (Johnson 2020a).
As Valluvan (2019, 110–111) has observed, drawing upon Gilroy (2005): “a
‘Rule Britannia’ version of empire continue[s] to assert itself at the center of
[Britain’s] national political culture.” It is no wonder, then, that the flurry of
media images later that summer of racialized migrants approaching the
British shoreline by boat created such a colonial response. Such is the dom-
inance of colonial tropes within British political life that in a subsequent
speech by the Prime Minister (which compared Covid-19 to a foreign
“invader” and discussed tighter border controls) he even drew upon
offshore imagery and the spectre of empire to announce state-investment
in wind energy:
I remember how some people used to sneer at wind power 20 years ago…
They forgot the history of this country. It was offshore wind that puffed the
sails of Drake and Raleigh and Nelson, and propelled this country to commercial
greatness. (Johnson 2020b)
Here, Drake, Raleigh and Nelson become “iconic human ciphers” of imperial-
ism (Gilroy 2005, 100), and their personal involvement in slavery, for example,
is ignored in the name of a maritime offshore colonial fantasy. But these all
too explicable visions of empire, and the corresponding offshore imaginary,
are not innocent, accidental misreading of history. As De Genova and Roy
(2020) have identified, the resurgence of rightwing nationalism across
Europe – which in Britain manifests itself through imperial nostalgia – is
not separate from the state-sponsored illegalization of migration which has
caused deaths at European borders, including in the English Channel.
It is within migration and asylum policy especially where these themes of
offshoring and coloniality come to the fore and take material form.
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Geographers, for example, have highlighted how asylum is increasingly exter-
nalized, offshored, and isolated within a global “enforcement archipelago”
(Mountz 2020). The offshore, then, is imagined as an invisible space, else-
where, out of sight, somewhere in which normal rules do not count, where
undesirable people can be placed (Potts 2019; Campling and Colas 2021).
The offshore turns legal rights (here to asylum) into ambiguous and indefinite
forms of abandonment. These efforts work in tandem with wider moves of
some states to push responsibility elsewhere, offering “protection-lite”
forms of asylum (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011, 30). Indeed, the practice of
offshoring asylum has been the exclusive preserve of former colonial and
settler-colonial states (European countries, the USA and Australia), who use
their wealth – or “commercial greatness” – generated through centuries of
colonial extraction, to keep the migrant other at bay, whilst warding off inter-
national legal pressures through geopolitical power. These efforts curtail the
incursion of what Goldberg (2006, 332) has called the “colonial outside”.
We can see how this manifests itself today by examining political responses
to the increased attempts of people seeking asylum to reach the UK using small
boats during 2020. Government documents leaked to the Guardian newspaper
in late 2020, which were labelled “sensitive” and “official”, revealed how during
the previous summer, the British state had been trialling:
a “blockade” tactic in the Channel on the median line between French and UK
waters, akin to the Australian “turn back” tactic…whereby migrant boats
would be physically prevented (most likely by one or more UK RHIBs [rigid
hull inflatable boats]) from entering UK waters. (Leaked government document,
cited in the Guardian 2020)
The Financial Times reported that the UK Home Office was considering pro-
posals to place a floating wall, sea barrier, or even wave machines in the
middle of the English Channel to prevent people seeking asylum from enter-
ing UK jurisdiction, and had been in secret feasibility consultations with Mar-
itime UK, a trade group which represents the shipping, port and marine
industry (Financial Times 2020). These nautical proposals to “wall off” the
British Isles from asylum responsibility are not new, they form part of a
wider political geography of wall-building that has heightened the violence
of borders around the world (Jones 2016).
These maritime measures, if put in place, would constitute “push-backs”
where would-be refugees are deflected from entering a territory and acces-
sing their right to due asylum process (Breen 2016). Although refugee
push-backs are illegal under international law – as enshrined under the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – such measures have
been witnessed recently at other European border zones (see Isakjee et al.
2020), and have been a routine part of the Australian “turn back the boats”
border policy for nearly two decades. The adoption of similar border practices
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by the British state, as set out by the UK Home Office in direct response to
Channel crossings, reflects the UK government’s view that irregular
Channel crossings are a threat that must be defended against.
As part of this agenda, obscure maritime laws have been utilized as a
means of criminalizing irregular Channel crossers, and therefore to deny
them access to asylum. If someone who is aboard such a vessel, then,
touches the tiller, oars, or steering device, they are liable to be arrested
under anti-smuggling laws. Eight people were jailed on these grounds in
2020; they faced prison sentences of up to two and a half years, and the sub-
sequent threat of deportation. By February 2021, the Home Office announced
via Twitter that a further seven people had been “jailed in the last four weeks
for steering small boats across the Channel” (Home Office 2021).3 By making
“steering” illegal, would-be refugees are criminalized before they disembark
on British territory. Not only does this offshored-criminalization perpetuate
a racialized narrative of “invasion”, it also obscures the fact that there are
no safe alterative routes with which to claim asylum in the UK. This is part
of the discourse that refugees are victims “targeted by people-smuggling net-
works” (Home Office 2020b), as opposed to primarily being endangered by
violent border regimes. Such actions, which seek to transform people
seeking asylum into criminal smugglers, therefore, attest to the sense that
irregular migrants can be treated as a maritime threat which must be met
with defensive actions.
Not only must this threat be defended against, but those who do get
through – and have not touched a tiller – should be cast away, processed
elsewhere, in an as yet indeterminate “offshore”. The UK government set
up a Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into “Channel crossings,
migration and asylum-seeking routes through the EU” in late 2020, holding
nine half-day sessions from September to December that year. During the
inquiry, one member of the committee called for the construction of an
offshore “civilized facility” that could be used to “process” asylum seekers.
He went further, asking the attending civil servants:
At the very least, why do we not have a civilised version of what Australia does,
which is to house and look after these people remotely, until such time as they
can establish that they have a genuine asylum claim? (Home Affairs Committee
2020b)
In response to this question, the Director General of HM Passport Office and
UK Visas and Immigration suggested that Brexit would allow “more flexibility”
in UK asylum policy, and that they were “exploring a number of different
options” in relation to offshoring (Home Affairs Committee 2020b). The fol-
lowing month, some of those options became apparent when the UK
Home Office told The Times newspaper that it was considering a range of
asylum policies, all of which involved a distinctly maritime logic that would
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offshore responsibility and outsource asylum beyond the territory of the UK.
These included imprisoning unwanted asylum applicants on disused ferries
moored off the British coastline; storing others on decommissioned North
Sea oil rigs; or even deporting applicants to overseas territories, such as St
Helena and Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, or to Papua New Guinea
or Morocco (Swinford and Gosden 2020).
The compulsion “to house and look after these people remotely” (Home
Affairs Committee 2020b), was complemented during the select committee
meetings by the suggestion: “shouldn’t civilised countries [like the UK] be
really supporting governments such as those in Lebanon and Turkey to
provide civilised environments for people?” (Home Affairs Committee
2020b). This sentiment not only reproduces the “dismally familiar frame of
imperial beneficence” (Stoler 2008, 191) whereby coloniality is justified
through enlightenment logics of saving the “uncivilised” other (Said 1978),
it is also another means of offshoring migration away from UK territory.
Within the responses to Channel crossings, then, we see “lingering
but usually unspoken colonial relationships and imperial fantasies”
(Gilroy 2005, 100).
Other offshore solutions to Channel crossings put forward by government
officials included proposals to persuade the French police to enforce their
own obscure marine traffic regulations. For example, one Committee
member suggested that: “to operate a boat above 5 horsepower in France
you require a Carte Mer. Is it not the case that the French authorities
should indeed pick these people up because they are operating boats illeg-
ally?” (Home Affairs Committee 2020c). This attempt to criminalize people
seeking asylum and obfuscate responsibility for refugees using the laws of
the sea, could also be witnessed in a Committee meeting held in December
2020, where the Minister for Immigration Compliance described the virtue of
so-called enforced rescue methods. According to his proposal, Channel cross-
ers would be detained and refouled at sea for their own protection. As
another Committee member explained, this would “enable the French,
under international law, to intercept and tow back migrants picked up by
British Border Force or to allow British Border Force to land them back on
French land” (Home Affairs Committee 2020a). Here, maritime conventions
of rescue, such as the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue (1979), could be used to subvert or supersede international rights
to asylum. This mendacious nautical workaround, taking place just a few
miles off the English coast, would not only allow the UK to avoid responsibil-
ity, but would do so in the name of humanitarianism. Such mechanisms
(denying rights under the discursive guise of humanitarian values) was
common in the age of Empire.
What tethers all of these maritime proposals together, is the political and
colonial imaginary of the offshore. As Appel (2012, 2019) has argued, the
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offshore represents an important physical and symbolic space within contem-
porary capitalism, not only providing “a literal watery stage for placeless
economic interaction” (Appel 2019, 3), but also, we argue, as an “empty”
geography to circumvent the inconveniences of asylum law. In the context
of the English Channel, the sea becomes a maritime space of exception.
This is not a new phenomenon, it is a longstanding imaginary operationalized
throughout empire. Those territories within the British Empire but outside of
the metropolitan space of the UK were treated as spaces of exception in
much the same way. Most relevant to our case here is that the offshore
was both somewhere that undesirable populations could be sent or kept,
and a space in which normal rules, laws and codes of behaviour did not
necessarily apply – as in the case of “enforced rescue methods”. As Achille
Mbembe articulates in his work on necropolitics (Mbembe 2003, 24): “colo-
nies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of
judicial order can be suspended – the zone where the violence of the state
of exception is deemed to operate in the service of ‘civilization’”. There are
many examples of this kind of logic in action, from convicts being sent to Aus-
tralia to violently settle and acquisition land, to the genocide enacted upon
Indigenous people (Wolfe 2015).
Extending Mbembe’s vision of the colony as a land-based space of excep-
tion, extraction and violence, we suggest the space of the sea is also a vital
place of colonial abandonment and control. “The offshore”, then, joins the
colony (Mbembe 2003), the plantation (McKittrick 2011), and the camp
(Davies and Isakjee 2019) as vital topographies of racial rule and colonial gov-
ernance. The offshore represents a capacious terra nullius (“nobody’s land”),
or in this case mare nullius (“nobody’s sea”), into which sovereign states
can so easily avoid responsibility. The offshoring of asylum, either by deport-
ing people to former colonies, housing asylum applicants aboard prison
ships, or enforcing refugee push-backs at sea, continues a colonial logic of
border governance that has long been central to UK asylum policy (see
Mayblin 2014, 2017).
From dumping enslaved people overboard, to prison hulks, to the threat of
sea-based deportation as a form of colonial discipline and punishment (Steirl,
2020); the offshore has long played a vital role in the colonial imagination.
Just as the sea has been a site of anti-colonial resistance (Legg 2020). We
see this throughout the history of maritime Empire, and we see it again
today play out in the discourse and actions of the British state regarding
Channel crossers. Offshoring is the coming together of the fantasy and tech-
nologies of the maritime Empire with the exceptional violence of the colony,
even as migrants themselves resist such injustice by continuing to move,
cross borders and claim a right to move, often born out of the connections
of Empire. Through offshoring, new territories (mare nullius) can either be
created on floating vessels, or existing territories bought through
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development funds to create spaces of terra nullius. The latter would mimic
the Australian approach on Manus Island and Papua New Guinea, the
former is something more distinct.4 All of these spaces become “historically
emptied places” (Vergara-Figueroa 2018); that is, both discursively unteth-
ered from the colonial logics that inform their creation, and the connected
histories which inspire them.
Offshoring migration governance parallels the networks of “off-shored”
security practices that have been resuscitated through the global war on
terror – including torture “black sites” and methods of extradition that rely
on both colonial military logics but also neocolonial prison outposts such
as those found on the Chagos island of Diego Garcia (Kapoor 2018; Li
2020). Here also spaces of exceptionalism are recreated in the service of
western interests and to imprison and punish those racialized as terrorists.
While outsourcing is not the focus of this article, it is so often an important
part of offshoring. Together the offshoring and outsourcing of migration
management connect to processes of racial capitalism both in terms of
how surplus populations are made and “dealt with” and the processes of
extraction, profit and inequality that this creates (see Rajaram 2018). The glo-
balization of migration control is an expensive business, with costly conces-
sions demanded by third countries which are often poorer postcolonial
states. For example, the UK has made agreements with former colonies
Jamaica and Pakistan for housing foreign national prisoners (De Noronha
2020). At the same time, private security companies and contractors increas-
ingly accumulate large profits from running border infrastructure, and asylum
services from detention centres to housing provision and deportations
(Darling 2016; Davitti 2019).
Through this discussion of the relationship between the fantasy of the
offshore as a policy solution to the arrival of people seeking asylum in
Britain we have further developed the analytical connection between the
legacy of colonial histories and the contemporary evolution of bordering
practices. In the following section, we draw out some conclusions.
Conclusion
This article has argued that British responses to irregular Channel crossings,
particularly ambitions of offshoring, must be situated within the context of
histories of colonialism and empire. Groups of migrants in small boats ventur-
ing upon the English Channel, enter a maritime space laden with material
legacies of colonialism and symbolic resonance evoking imperial histories
and myths; imaginaries of colonial conquest, defensive retreats, armadas
and flotillas all combine to construct the borders around British nationhood.
Just as the imaginary of invasion by sea restructures the nostalgic promise of
a militarized nation holding out against the “barbarians” (Gilroy 2016), the
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justification of “push back” and offshoring draws upon colonial logics of valu-
able vs disposable lives. In doing so, it exposes people seeking asylum to ter-
raqueous harms on both land and at sea. The offshoring of infrastructure
designed to repel migrants and migrant detention shares a rationale with
the wider processes of border externalization (Bialasiewicz and Maessen
2018). However it also makes use of popular conceptions of the sea as a
mare nullius, an empty space, a space of exception from which people
wrongly deemed “illegal” can arrive – and to which and through which,
they can illegally be returned. The space of the sea then does political
work, by establishing a territorial or extra-territorial space to which responsi-
bility can be off-shored.
Whereas the language of action, enterprise and of vibrancy are often
evoked in celebration of imperial expansion, the mobilities of migrants,
including people seeking asylum, are not framed as progressive human
endeavours, but rather as acts of transgression. Whilst this is largely unrecog-
nized (explicitly) in the contemporary debates around Channel crossing, colo-
nial ideas nonetheless inform the treatment of asylum in Britain today
(Mayblin 2019). Framed as “illegal migration”, “illegal movement” and
through militarized discourse, people seeking asylum are now treated as an
“invading force” and rendered a racialized threat (see De Genova 2018).
This works to erase the connections that asylum seekers may have to claim
rights and settlement in post-metropoles like the UK based on histories of
colonial and imperial ties, exploitation and violence, alongside international
laws on refuge.
When colonial logics and contemporary border politics come together,
their entanglement becomes hard to ignore. As Shotwell (2016, 38) argues,
“we might like to think that the present can be innocent of the past that pro-
duced it” – however, thinking through the imperial fantasies inherent in the
“offshoring” of racialized asylum seekers, it is clear that the inheritance of
Empire and colonial thinking has not disappeared at all, but has mutated
into more palatable forms. In these ways, the violent and militarized border
practices we are seeing imagined and enacted in the Channel are not
merely a legacy of Empire, a “remainder”, but the active remaking of colonial
modes of rule through the ongoing logics of authorized and unauthorized
mobilities. This situation that we describe is not unique to British imperial
nostalgia. The active remaking of colonial modes of governing irregular
migration can be witnessed at many borders around the world. Such logics
and practices work to hide and conceal racism under a veneer of liberalism
(Isakjee et al. 2020) and through discourses of illegality, invasion, and
“threat” at international borders. The Channel has become, then, yet
another site for the symbolic and material manifestations of the deadly after-
life of colonialism.
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Notes
1. For example, the Port of Dover which handles 17% of the UK’s entire trade in
goods reported a 13.7 and 14.3 per cent reduction in Road Haulage Vehicle
traffic in the first and second quarters of 2020 respectively (Port of Dover 2021).
2. 1,825 people crossed the Channel by small boat in 2019, up from 299 in 2018
(Home Affairs Committee 2020a).
3. They were charged under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971. In 2020 the
UK arrested 116 people linked to small boat crossings.
4. Precursors to these exclusionary maritime methods can also be found in the
Caribbean during the 1970s and 80s, when refugees fleeing Haiti and Cuba
were routinely intercepted by US forces (Mountz 2020).
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